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r a c t
nnected world is what current technologies look for, being Web Based Social Networks (WBSNs) a promising development in this regard. Four 
BSN features are identiﬁed, namely, interoperability, reusability, protection against WBSNs providers and indirect relationships. A protocol, 
, addressed interoperability and reusability of identity data, resources and access control poli-cies between different WBSNs. In order to 
e remaining couple of features, that is, achieving the protection of data against WBSNs providers and indirect relationships management across ures 
ility
BSNs, this paper presents eU+F, an extension of U+F. A prototype is developed to verify the feasibility of implementing the proposed protocol 
vironment, as well as to compare its workload regarding three well-known WBSNs, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn.
for i
tusN
o, 20
oreo
blish
ct con
of t
), so
eleva
ect r
user
mina
n th
cons
attem
; di
red Social Networks
uction
ecent years until present timemuchmore than a hundred
ased Social Networks (WBSNs) have emerged, being Face-
Space, Badoo and LinkedIn some representative examples.
eager to interact with their contacts, even considering
nds, families or just work partners. They desire to share
eriences either by interchanging elements such as photos
or using speciﬁc applications to satisfy their expectations.
the quantity and assorted purposes ofWBSNs, userswant
ct with people no matter the WBSN in which they are
thereby attaining interoperability and reusability accord-
ources, identitydata andaccess control policies. Resources
rrespond to photos, videos and audio ﬁles and identity
rs to proﬁle and contact relationship data. Speciﬁcally,
ability refers to achieve data management between dif-
SNs and reusability can be identiﬁed as a complementary
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1 http://onteroperability, like OpenID1 which bases on identity data
et that focuses on resources interoperability (Aiello and
12).
ver, most of WBSN users look for new people to whom
some kind of relationship, without necessarily being
tacts. Indeed, indirect relationships are an inherent prop-
he society, as C. Calhoun noticed (Acquisti and Gross,
ciety is a question of social integration where the grow-
nce of indirect relationships is related to modernity. Thus,
elationships inWBSNs correspond to thenumberof jumps
s can perform from one user to others, also called depth
ti et al., 2006, 2007), and their establishment is essential.
e other hand, the protection of data against unnoticed or
enteduses is other desirable feature. Therehavebeen sev-
pts to conceal data from servers (Jammalamadaka et al.,
Vimercati et al., 2007) and, regarding recent trends, it is
as data exposure minimization (Ciriani et al., 2011). In the
jority of cases, when registering in aWBSN it ismandatory
the established privacy policy. Multiple WBSN privacypecify the management and use of all uploaded data. An
y related example is the new Google’s privacy policy in
penid.net/ (last accessed October 2013).
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vious protocol achieved interoperability and reusabil-
en WBSNs combining the application of User-Managed
MA) protocol and the Friend-Of-A-Friend (FOAF) project
z-Manzano et al., 2012). UMA refers to an architecture
col to give web users control over who and what can
s to their online personal data (Kantara Members, 2009).
st, the latter, FOAF, provides guidelines to develop ﬁles
g personal data and relationship among different users
am, 2000). This previous protocol was called UMA+FOAF
twork Protocol (U+F).
er to address the remaining couple of features, par-
data exposure minimization and indirect relationships
ent across differentWBSNs, this paper presents Extended
AF Social Network Protocol (eU+F). eU+F is an exten-
U+F which combines UMA and FOAF, together with
phic techniques. Given that eU+F extends U+F, their
g architecture is similar. It must be noted that enti-
lve in the architecture are well-known in the security
nd they usually appear in access control architectures
n, 2001). Thus, the main contribution of this paper
ocol which protects the stored resources while pro-
teroperability among different WBSNs and enabling a
anagementofuser-to-user relationships for access control
.
aluation of eU+F is performed at two different levels, the-
to verify the satisfaction of the proposed requirements
rimentally to analyse the protocolworkloadusing a proto-
ides, the experimental evaluation includes a comparison
eU+F workload and that of three of the most successful
amely, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn. Thanks to the
d evaluation (which is much more comprehensive than
F) it is possible to assess the suitability of the proposal in
settings.
aper is structured as follows. Section2 describes related
ction3 introduces the set of works which lay the bases of
r. Section4 presents a general overview of eU+F. Section5
the system model, involving the requirements to attain,
and adversary models and the proposed architecture.
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Interoperability/reusability
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√
(Aiello and Ruffo, 2012)
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penid.net/ (last accessed October 2013).
iasporaproject.org/ (last accessed October 2013).
addons.mozilla.org/en-US/ﬁrefox/tag/scramble (last accessed October 2013).ntal evaluation, including the developed prototype and
chieved. Section11 presents a discussion concerning
ents that can be performed on eU+F to reach a powerful
. Finally, in Section12 conclusions and open research
presented.
d work
sting and multiple proposals focus on providing certain
teroperability between WBSNs. In general, they present
lar social network structure within which data and access
olicies aremanaged following a speciﬁc pattern, including
hem the use of cryptographic techniques. Table 1 presents
s of the analysis, identifying per each studied proposal if it
s interoperability/reusability, data exposureminimization
direct relationship management.
at amount of proposals address interoperability and
ticularly manage direct relationships. The most related
is Lockr (Tootoonchianet al., 2009),which runs in central-
Ns and decentralized peer-to-pear (P2P) systems. It bases
terchanged of tokens, referred as social attestations, that
e relationship between a issuer and a receiver. LotusNet
d Ruffo, 2012) is other challenging approach, it consists
ystem in which peers store resources locally and it relies
graphy to guarantee strong authentication and conﬁden-
ough the use of distributed hash tables. Other noticeable
rPl (Seong et al., 2010), a decentralized architecture based
ng personal data on chosen hosts, called Personal butlers
anagement of data through the interchange of tickets
contacts. Similarly, Conti et al. (2011) introduce Virtual
ocial Networks (VPSN). These particular social networks
f storing personal data in a personal server and sending
mation toWBSNs like Facebook. Then, special xmlﬁles are
ers contacts to retrieve the real information. Furthermore,
pproach is proposed by Riesner and Pernul (2012). They
global model which points out the need of managing data
ently of WBSNs, known as Social Identity Management
ttaining that users control in great depth their identity
trast, a relevant amount of works applies cryptographic
es and deal with data exposure minimization. Two dif-
ts of proposals are identiﬁed, those focused on direct
hips management and those oriented to the indirect ones.
g direct relationships, which are addressed by the major-
ors, FlyByNight (Lucas and Borisov, 2008) is a challenging
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ent. It focuses on posted messages which are presented
d in the WBSN, Facebook in this case, and they only are
d using the appropriate decryption keys. Applying differ-
iques, Guha et al. (2008) present NOYB, an approach to
ata applying a pseudo-random substitution cipher from
dictionary. Other remarkable proposal is LifeSocial.KOM
al., 2010), a P2P architecture inwhich resources are stored
d through a symmetric algorithm and the decryption pro-
erform through an asymmetric algorithm. A different
phic algorithm is applied in Persona (Baden et al., 2009)
ages access control through the application of attribute
ryption cryptography. In particular, the main issue refers
e of attributes in the establishment and creation of keys
s control policies.
other hand, according to indirect relationships a pair of
es are noticed. Prometheus (Kourtellis et al., 2010) bases
service which recollects encrypted data from multiple
sers are connected through a social graph inwhich nodes
ds to trusted peers who store data encrypted and edges
gs that represent access control policies. From a different
ve, Frikken and Srinivas (2009) bases on exclusively man-
ess control by the establishment of access control policies
jumps between users. Moreover, it mainly focuses on
data exposure minimization making use of a particular
phic technique which consists of using, per each user, as
s as the maximum number of jumps accepted. Further-
ferent to all previous contributions, in this proposal not
key management be performed by WBSN users, but also
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en supported by some WBSNs, i.e. MySpace, it mainly
interoperability in terms of identity data. Diaspora3 is
cial example. It is a distributed social network based on
hitecture in which peers stored their personal resources
cular host and remain them available for their contacts.
pplying cryptographic algorithms to encrypt stored data,
osure minimization is also addressed. However, though
ocus of Diaspora is to achieve interoperability, currently,
N exclusively interacts with Diaspora servers, called
o looking for protecting data against WBSNs providers,
4 is a remarkable solution. It is a Firefox plugin which
sers access control preferences through the application
graphic techniques to all data uploaded to the web.
ering the previous analysis, neither of the previous pro-
anage indirect relationships (of an unlimited depth) while
or interoperability as well as preventing data from being
by WBSNs without users consent. This need motivates
col proposed in this paper.
round
SN is described as a large quantity of users connected
each other that manage and access multiple and assorted
he one hand, userswhoupload data andmanage themare
s administrators and userswho request access to data ares control policies linked to resources and thepersonalpro-
e data are stored in each WBSN where users are enrolled.
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at fact, WBSNs can be identiﬁed as different worlds which
the management and storage of data, as Fig. 1 depicts.
heless, the centralizationof datamakesdifﬁcultmanaging
ability and reusability and looking for these requirements
on U+F was developed (González-Manzano et al., 2012).
of U+F is the creation of a single world where all kind
s are interoperable between each other. In this protocol
, identity data (proﬁle and contacts relationships) and
ntrol policies are located out of WBSNs to be reused and
y access control management (Fig. 2). In this section UMA
are described together with a brief summary of U+F to
the basis for the work presented herein.
-Managed Access (UMA) speciﬁcation
A architecture and core protocol (Machulak et al., 2010;
, 2012), based on OAuth, provides a dedicated access rela-
service in different web domains where users are able to
e conditions of access and terminate relationships easily.
vides key features to achieve resources and access control
teroperability and reusability between different services
esources are stored in Hosts and access control policies in
facilitating the access fromdifferent services to resources
s control policies.
l UMA implementations5 have been developed but they
lated to WBSNs. There are one commercial UMA autho-
erver and a total of three publicly available projects,
rly, the Fraunhofer AISEC project (which offers a client,
d a Host currently running), the OXAuth project (that
the implementation of UMA for enterprise usages) and
T project (which involves the implementation of UMA
with sample applications).
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7 http://wAF Team, 2000). It combines the use of the Resource
on Framework (RDF) and the Web Ontology Language
ore speciﬁcally, the FOAF speciﬁcation provides guide-
tructure and develop ﬁles in which personal data, such as
one, homepage, interests or photos or known users, like
r relatives, are described.
ﬁed in Carminati et al. (2009), FOAF seems a promising
in regard to the speciﬁcation of user identity within the
ontext. MultipleWBSNs, such as Twitter, and social appli-
ike Second Life, make use of it.6,7
Social Network Protocol
FOAF Social Network Protocol (U+F) is a novel develop-
anage interoperability and reusability between WBSNs
z-Manzano et al., 2012). Interoperability management is
the literature as the Wall Garden Problem (Yeung et al.,
refers to the inability of WBSNs to work together within
ss any type of boundary in order to advance the effec-
munication of all users. It is associated with the access
erent WBSNs to resources, identity data and access con-
ies.Moreover, reusability is another issuemanaged inU+F.
entioned, if elements are interoperable between WBSNs,
be equally used and, also, reused.
sential purpose of U+F is the acquisition of identity data
urces either personal or of a direct contact enrolled in
or in a different WBSN. UMA is applied to decentralize
and access control policies and FOAF to decentralized
ata.
sonal ﬁle
ty data is composed of users’ proﬁles and contacts’ rela-
data. They are structured and stored in FOAF ﬁles. As
in González-Manzano et al. (2012), attributes “national-
SNs”, “creation date”, “trust” and “duration” are at stake.
that, in U+F, reduced FOAF ﬁles are also used, called in
nn et al., 2009) sub-proﬁles. These ﬁles contain less data
inal FOAF ﬁles and they are applied in the access control
ent process.
hitecture
composed of six types of entities which are described as
): A user plays different roles. On the one hand, a user
he role of a UMA’s Requesting Party (RP) who is able to
resources of his contacts through WBSNs. On the other
a user also plays the role of an Authorizing User (AU)
ating resources in his Host, his FOAF ﬁle in his Identity
er (IdP) and established policies in his AuthorizationMan-
y provider (IdP): Repository of FOAF ﬁles which are placed
, aswell as provider of claims. This entity canbe compared
Host but instead of storing resources, it stores identity
esides, to manage claims, per each user, IdPs store a list of
rtiﬁcation Authorities (IdP CAs) that each user considers
e. Moreover, to guarantee communications with WBSNs
e trusted by users, per user, a list of WBSN Certiﬁcation
rities (WBSN CAs) which are considered trustworthy is
ored.
epository of resources, analogous to a data base service,
ch the AU stores resources.
ww.xul.fr/web-2.0.html (last accessed February 2014).
ww.w3.org/wiki/FoafSites (last accessed February 2014).
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ization manager (AM): Entity that evaluates policies pre-
established by an AU. However, to achieve this purpose
requests claims to performpolicy validation and delivers
. Also, in order to verify claims, they store, per each user,
f the IdP CAs trusted by the user. Likewise, to communi-
ith WBSNs considered trusted by users, per user, a list of
CAs which are considered reliable is also stored.
ased Social Networks: Provide an interface to show
ces and identity data and also, provide the management
comments, resource comments and any other extra ser-
oreover, this entity acts on behalf of a RP and interacts
osts to reach protected resources; interacts with AMs
the appropriate token in regard to requested resources;
teracts with the adequate IdP to get users’ personal data
ime a user session starts. Each WBSN owns a certiﬁcate
ted by a WBSN Certiﬁcation Authority (WBSN CA).
ation authorities (CA): These entities are in charge of
ing certiﬁcates to trusted entities to allow them signing
angedmessages. Apair of groups aredistinguished. Aﬁrst
provides certiﬁcates to IdPs (IdP CAs) and another group
Ns (WBSN CAs). Then, per user, AMs and IdPs store a list
CAs to ensure, along the protocol execution, that claims
vided from trusted IdPs. Likewise, IdPs andAMs store, per
list of WBSN CAs to ensure that interoperability is only
d between trusted WBSNs.
overview
ing Section2, a couple of demanding necessities are rec-
being both of them out of the scope of U+F (Section3.3).
n current WBSNs, indirect relationships have to be man-
ond, data is out of users control and WBSNs can use it
wn purposes without users consent, being the protection
ue called data exposure minimization. In order to face up
challenges a more powerful and secure protocol is pro-
2014
and
on r
(com
othe
can
and
col, f
relat
the r
acce
havi
havi
be st
F
tacts
unkn
betw
of in
D
be u
and
tacts
are d
ceed
U+F,
fact
relat
tion
cont
of in
alrea
U1 w
recti
it is
betw
certi
sent
(solithis work, Extended UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol
e Fig. 3). From amore speciﬁc point of view, in eU+F iden-
orresponds to the proﬁle and contacts of each user and it
in the form of FOAF ﬁles within Identity Providers (IdPs)
it is clear
relations
However
get accesFig. 4. Managed relationships.
F); resources are stored encrypted in chosen Hosts (as in
eing encrypted in this extension); and access control poli-
ocated in Authentication Managers (AMs) which perform
ntrol on behalf of the users (as in U+F).
ding access control management, this protocol applies an
ntrol systembasedonanExtensionofUCONABC access con-
el, called SoNeUCONABC (González-Manzano et al., 2013,
is model mainly basis on managing subjects, objects
tionships attributes. Moreover, it is specially focused
nships management either unidirectional, bidirectional
d of a pair of directional ones), direct, indirect or any
e. Although within SoNeUCONABC model access control
ased on any type of relationship between the requester
dministrator of the requested data, within eU+F proto-
mplicity reasons and analogous to U+F, only bidirectional
hips between the administrator of the requested data and
ster are considered. Then, for instance, if UserA wants to
a resource of UserB, it is required that UserA has speciﬁed
relationships with UserB, as well as UserB has speciﬁed
relationship with UserA. These direct relationships must
in each user’s FOAF ﬁle.
rmore, in eU+F, regarding the discovery of indirect con-
hough it could be done from scratch (i.e. selecting an
user and searching between an indirect relationship
himand the requester), it is assumedthatusers accessdata
t contacts that can be reached from their direct contacts.
te aforementioned, the mechanism proposed herein can
for any type of relationship between the administrator
equester of a particular data and also, other indirect con-
overy procedure can be applied. These generalizations
ssed in Section11. Following, the way in that eU+F pro-
illustrated with an example (see Fig. 4). Analogously to
ming a direct relationship between U2 and U1, and the
U1 wants to access U2’s data, the access is granted if the
hip is bidirectional and a proof of the existence of the rela-
U2–U1 is obtained from IdP U2, that is, U1 is within U2’s
(solid arrow). On the other hand, given the management
t relationships proposed in eU+F, supposing that U1 has
ccessed to U2’s proﬁle (including his direct contacts) and
to accessU4’s data, the access is granted if there exist bidi-
relationships between all involved users in the path and
ned from IdP U4 a proof of the existence of a relationship
U4–U1. This proof is constructed step by step. First, IdP U3
the relationship U3–U1 (solid arrow) and then, after pre-
is proof to IdP U4, this IdP certiﬁes the relationshipU4–U3
ow). Finally, the proof U4–U1 is constructed. Therefore,
ly noticed that access control bases on the existence of
hips in the opposite direction to the discovery of contacts.
, it is remarkable that getting the proof is not enough to
s because it depends on access control policies and thus,
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Finally, note that the set of relationships that aremanaged
re the most practical ones for efﬁciency reasons because
n, in each step, the next contact of the relationship.
ing eU+Fworkingplan, it bases on theacquisitionof iden-
and resources of WBSN users. The overall idea behind the
n of these data are analogous to U+F but needing, ﬁrst,
gement of proofs (elements that compose claims) to ver-
istence of indirect relationships and, second, the use of
phy to deal with data exposure minimization. Then, the
n of identity data and resources is summarized as follows.
er logins in aWBSN, data are requested to the appropriate
st and it redirects to the necessary AM to verify policies
to the requested data. After policies have been properly
to perform this veriﬁcation appropriate claims should be
), theAMgrants or denies access deliveringornot a ticket,
en, to be presented to the data storage. Then, if the token
ata are granted. Lastly, as granted data are encrypted, its
n is performed at users browsers. More speciﬁcally, eU+F
sed of four phases. The ﬁrst phase is the initialization. It
he conﬁguration of entities and elements involved in the
Subsequently, the second phase startswhen auser logins
N. At this moment, the user accesses to his identity data
cts data which are stored in the chosen IdP. Besides, his
, stored in a particular Host, remain available. The third
the access to data of a direct contact who is enrolled
rent WBSN. In particular, it is divided in accessing to the
identity data and resources. Finally, access to an indirect
nrolled in another WBSN (different from any other) is the
e. It is also divided in the acquisition of identity data and
and it works similar to access to a direct contact data but
a proof to verify the existence of the appropriate indirect
ip.
model
odel involves the speciﬁcation of requirements (Sec-
the trust and adversary model (Section5.2) and the
re (Section5.3).
irements
ing eU+F features, the following requirements are chal-
attain:
onﬁdentiality and access control. Data has to be exclu-
delivered and used by authorized users and entities
d in theprotocol.Moreover, it isnoticeable that theaccess
l has to be performed by themanagement of relationships
n administrators and requesters.
perability and reusability regarding direct and indi-
lationships.The communication and interchange of data
n multiple users enrolled in different WBSNs has to be
d.
of trust.Given the great set of entities at stake, the ﬁnal
r has to be able to verify that entities throughwhich inter-
d messages pass are trusted.
rivacy preservation against WBSNs.Data has to be
tely protected fromWBSNsand to achieve it, this require-
s subdivided as follows:
(b
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ta exposure minimization.A particular set of data has to
ain inaccessible toWBSNs, being protected against inap-
priate managements. Furthermore, it is desirable that
sts do not get access to data.
The a
entities a
are the acessibility to minimum data. The amount of data acces-
le to WBSNs has to be minimized. Once a WBSN accesses
data of a user of any WBSN, the management has to
carried out using the least possible data. Indeed, this is
ectly related with “The principle of least privilege” which
ses on the fact that every programme should operate using
least possible amount of privileges (Saltzer and Kumar,
75). In particular, this is called dataminimization (Borcea-
tzmann et al., 2011) and it can be identiﬁed as a common
nciple in thedevelopmentof PrivacyEnhancingTechnolo-
s.
key management. Keys have to be easily managed,
means thatdecryptionkeysarenotdistributedoutofband
s it is done in Baden et al. (2009) or in Guha et al. (2008)
e, due to the large amount of users, the distribution can
e unmanageable.
t and adversary model
social networking world the adversary is directly related
tions that illegitimately manage personal information. In
col, resources, identitydata andaccess control policies are
lized and WBSNs do not store and directly manage them.
, WBSNs act as interfaces which present requested data.
ding these features, the trustmodel bases on the following
tions:
d AMs are trusted entities. In other words, these entities
maliciously manipulate data and they perform operations
ng strictly eU+F speciﬁcations.
re untrusted entities. They may use data for their own
es but carry out operations regarding rigorous eU+F spec-
ns.
are considered untrusted entities. They may use data for
n purposes, as well as, they may try to act on behalf of
r when he is not logged in the WBSN. Nonetheless, given
goal of this protocol is to attain interoperability between
, all of these applications have to fairly manage all mes-
nvolved in the protocol. On the contrary, if a particular
alters messages content or produces incorrect message
ies, it would damage its own business model, leading the
WBSNs and users who trust it to lose their conﬁdence.
ous to many web applications in which personal data
naged, communications between entities are carried out
a conﬁdential and mutual-authenticated channel, such
ding previous assumptions the adversary corresponds to a
at acquires and illegitimately manipulates and uses iden-
and resources of its users for multiple purposes (leak
ion to external parties). For instance, WBSNs can use data
tising or, even worst, for trading with other companies.
lly, these applications are in charge of sending and receiv-
ages to and from IdPs, Hosts and AMs on behalf of users
quently,WBSNs canobtain asmuch information as possi-
gh encrypted) when a user is not really logged. Similarly,
re resources and they may use them for their own pur-
itecturerchitecture of eU+F is composed by the same groups of
s those of U+F (recall Section3.3.2). The main differences
ddition of a new set of certiﬁcation authorities for AMs
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), and the introduction of new tasks for existing entities.
oduced changes are explained below:
eU+F, user resources are stored symmetrically encrypted
key called resources decryption key (DK). Besides, they
also establish the necessary relationships between their
nd their IdPs and their AMs. In addition, each user is in
of creating, at least, a symmetric key used in the encryp-
d decryption of resources and an asymmetric key pair
can correspond to a private key and the associated public
tiﬁcate or to a created key pair) to manage decryptions
erchanges of encrypted data. These keys are used in the
s described in Section7 to attain data exposure minimi-
provider (IdP): IdPs are now responsible for creating
d FOAF ﬁles regarding stored FOAF ﬁles and access control
processed by AMs. In other words, IdPs store complete
les but certain attributes and relationship data can be
ble to some users and denied to others, being necessary
ation of FOAF ﬁles, called reduced FOAF ﬁles, which only
data in respect to access control policies satisfaction.
oncerning hosts, stored resources have to be periodically
ypted, either by the host under the users’ supervision or
by userswhoupdate the data re-encrypting itwith a new
tice that re-encryptions require theupdateof theusedkey
ppropriate IdP.
zation manager (AM): This entity owns a certiﬁcate and
ociated private key to sign claims. Then, trustworthiness
ested claims is guaranteed.
sed Social Network (WBSN): In eU+F, these entities provide
er, used by their users, to perform the decryption and
tation of resources and identity data. Besides, they may
other extra services such as wall comments, resource
nts or adds management which are offered as in a com-
eb applications like currentWBSNs. Indeed, these services
focus of the WBSNs’ business model, marking differences
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ation authorities (CA): In the proposed protocol, a new
of certiﬁcation authorities is introduced (AM CA) which
s certiﬁcates to AMs that comply to a set of CA-deﬁned
that iden
identify a
natures, t
claims murthermore, Hosts and IdPs can refer to personal servers
Ns users or servers of particular companies.
otivation of having three sets of CAs is twofold. First, it is
nt in a real-world scenario since it is the most simple set-
the administrative point of view. Second, it is beneﬁcial
security point of view since it responds to the separation
principle. Nevertheless, cross-certiﬁcation and mutual
on agreements could exist among them, as it happens in
eployments.
protocol description
scription of eU+F is divided in the deﬁnition of messages
Section6.1), thedeﬁnitionof theexecutionprocedure, that
ases involved in the protocol (Section6.2), and the spec-
of concrete differences between the execution procedure
nd U+F (Section6.3).
ages content
the protocol an assorted set of messages is interchanged.
ciﬁcally,messages content corresponds to operations, ele-
d structures.
erations
tions involved in eU+F correspond to signatures and
ns. Moreover, in respect to encryption, symmetric and
ric algorithms are applied according to the cryptographic
proposed in Section7 to deal with data exposure minimi-
ments
eral, there are six elements within interchanged mes-
er identiﬁers, which refer to emails stored in a hashed
ns, that have attached an expiration time; ﬁle identiﬁers,
tify identity data (FOAF ﬁles) and resources; tickets, that
requested data and are used to get access tokens; sig-
hat include a time stamp and are specially signiﬁcant in
anagement attesting the existence of users attributes and
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Table 2
Interchanged messages in eU+F.
Id Name Content
M1 Token request Ticket ||WBSNR Cert Serial Number|| Date timeWBSNRsignature ||
SkWBSNR Cert
(complete message)
M2 Token request redirection Ticket ||AM location
M3 Token response redirection Ticket ‖Tokenvalue‖Expired− in‖AMA Cert Serial Number‖Date timeAMAsignature ‖
SkAMA Cert
(complete message)
M4 Token response Token response redirection ||WBSNR Cert Serial Number|| Date timeWBSNRsignature ‖
SkWBSNR Cert
(complete message)
M5 File request R Id ||A Id||File Id||WBSNR Cert Serial Number|| Date timeWBSNRsignature ‖
SkWBSNR Cert
(complete message)
M6 File indirect request R Id ‖A Id‖File Id‖WBSNR Cert Serial Number‖Date timeWBSNRsignature ‖
SkWBSNR Cert
(complete message)
M7 File response R Id ‖A Id‖EkR (ﬁle)
M8 Claims request R Id ‖A Id‖EkCertIdPR (DataRrequest)‖AMA Cert Serial Number‖
Date timeAMAsignature‖S k CertAM A (complete message)
M9 Claims structures response R Id ‖A Id‖AccreditationR‖EkCertAMA (Data Rresponse)‖IdPR Cert Serial Number‖
Date timeIdPRsignature‖SkIdPR (complete message)
M10 Claims response Claims structures response ||RelationshipR A1||IdPA Cert Serial Number||
Date timeIdPAsignature‖SkIdPA (RelationshipR A 1)‖WBSNR Cert Serial Number‖
Date timeWBSNRsignature ‖SkWBSNR Cert (complete message)
M11 Certify direct relationship R Id ‖A Id‖AccreditationR‖IdPR Cert Serial Number‖Date timeIdPRsignature‖
SkIdPR
(AccreditationR)‖RelationshipR A1‖WBSNR Cert Serial Number‖
Date timeWBSNRsignature ‖SkWBSNR Cert (complete message)
M12 Certify indirect relationship R Id ‖A Id‖AccreditationR‖IdPR Cert Serial Number‖Date timeIdPRsignature‖
SkIdPR
(Accreditation R) ||RelationshipR Ai||IdPA i Cert Serial Number||
Date timeIdPAi signature
‖SkIdPAi
(RelationshipR A i)‖RelationshipR A1‖
WBSNA Cert Serial Number‖Date timeWBSNAsignature‖SkWBSNA Cert (complete message)
M13 Relationship certiﬁed R Id ‖A Id‖RelationshipR A1‖IdPA Cert Serial Number‖Date timeIdPAsignature‖
SkIdPA
(Relationship R A1)
M14 Simple token request Ticket
M15 Simple token response Ticket ‖Tokenvalue‖Expired− in‖AMA Cert Serial Number‖Date timeAMAsignature ‖
SkAMA Cert
(complete message)
M16 Simple ﬁle request R Id || File Id
M17 Simple ﬁle response R Id ‖EkR (ﬁle)
M18 Simple claim request R Id ||A Id
M19 Simple claim response R Id ‖IdPR Cert Serial Number‖AccreditationR‖Date time ‖
(Accr
M20 t ||Tok
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ips; and redirections, which refer to URLs that point out
on of the entities to which redirections are performed.
uctures
ures correspond to sets of elements over which opera-
performed. In eU+F there are four main types of applied
s: the Accreditation which identiﬁes who is the requester
ular requested ﬁle; the RelationshipA-Bi, that refers to the
s of the users involved in a relationship, where i refers to
er of jumps that separate both users; and the Data request
ata response that are used to verify the satisfaction of
blished access control policy. The former is provided by
ster and consists of the name of the attributes involved
plied policy, that is, attributes: att1 att2 att3 . . ., and the
rs to the values of all requested attributes within a Data
at is, attributes: att1 att2 att3 . . . attributesData: valueAtt1
valueAtt3.
ges interchanged in the eU+F protocol are depicted in
here symbol || implies concatenation, S refers to sig-
d E to encryption. This table presents each message
regard to operations, elements and structures aforemen-
onetheless, technical details of interchangedmessages are
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are sut in Appendix A. Interchanged messages mainly follow
re protocol speciﬁcation (Hardjono, 2012), although some
s have been added in some cases and a few new messages
n speciﬁed.
6.2.1. Ini
In this
sists of th
of entitiesIdPRsignature
editation R)
envalue
ution procedure
ing the protocol phases described in Section4, eU+F is
n four phases: the initialization phase, in which the ini-
n of entities is performed; User logins in a WBSN, in
user, in the role of a RP, logins in a WBSN and accesses
crypted identity data and resources, being data locally
d; User accesses to data of a direct contact where a user,
e role of a RP, tries to access to the proﬁle and resources of
ontact who is registered in a different WBSN, being data
crypted; and User access to data of an indirect contact
a user, again in the role of a RP, accesses to data of an
ser who is registered in a different WBSN (data are also
crypted). It is remarkable that accessing a direct or an
ontact data within the same WBSN follows the same pro-
accessing data of a user enrolled in a different one. Most
phases in eU+Falreadyexisted inU+F.However, in order to
henewrequirements,multiple changes are neededwithin
se. For the sake of clarity, each phase will be explained
U+F and eU+F related issues. Introduced modiﬁcations
arized in Section6.3.tialization
phase entities are prepared with all required data. It con-
eRegistrationof resources and identity data, theRegistration
and the Speciﬁcation of main information in WBSNs.
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e theration of resources and identity data. In this phase resources
d in chosenHosts and theappropriate FOAFﬁle in the cho-
his pair of tasks is analogous to that of UMA (Machulak
10). Moreover, the user, in the role of an AU, symmet-
crypts resources using a DK key and uploads them to
osts. Similarly, identity data together with the used DK
ded to chosen IdPs.
ration of entities. This phase consists of the establishment
t relationship between a Host or an IdP and an AM. In
r, it involves the registration of a Host in an AM and the
on of an IdP in an AM, which can be the same AM or a dif-
e. These registrations are equivalent to the introduction
AM described in UMA (Machulak et al., 2010).
llowing step is the creation and establishment of access
olicies in chosen AMs. Furthermore, the registration
ontinues specifying in AMs the list of trusted IdP CAs
N CAs, in IdPs the list of trusted IdP CAs, AM CAs and
s and in Hosts the list of trusted WBSN CAs. To conclude,
eﬁnes in his IdPs, Hosts and AMs the list of WBSNs with
desires to interact. He also establishes in his IdPs, AMs
Ns an accepted time stamp threshold in order to control
s expiration time.
cation of main information in WBSNs. Once a user enrols in
he has to specify the IdP in which his FOAF ﬁle is stored
ost which stores his resources. Likewise, to allow inter-
etween WBSNs, in each of them the set of WBSNs with
mmunications are available has to be established. Look-
ers’ expectations it would be desirable to maximize the
f WBSNs that can interact between each other.
r logins in a WBSN
a user, in the role of a RP, logins in aWBSN three processes
d out, his authentication, the acquisition of his proﬁle and
nd the acquisition of his resources which remain accessi-
e not directly presented. The step of accessing a protected
of the UMA protocol (Machulak et al., 2010; González-
al., 2010) is executed a couple of times: the WBSN, in
f a requester and on behalf of the user, contacts ﬁrst the
to get his FOAF ﬁle and second, the user’s Host to get his
.
, users can delegate in WBSNs to access to his data. How-
re the delegation, the user authenticates himself against
and IdP to inform that he is logged in the WBSN which
his behalf until his log-out. Guaranteeing that WBSNs do
n behalf of users when they are logged out requires per-
he authentication procedure in the log in and out in the
ereby informing the user’s IdP andHost that he is or is not
d.
nishing the authentication, following the UMA protocol,
e and contacts of the user (the FOAF ﬁle) are directly pre-
d his resources remain accessible to be retrieved when
laims and tokens used to get the FOAF ﬁle can be reused
ources. Indeed, claims, that consist of theuser’s email hash
signed (called herein accreditation), are stored in WBSNs
h user session to be repetitively used until they expire.
ess, it should be noticed that data is locally decrypted.
r accesses to data of a direct contact
r, once logged in a WBSN, may want to access to data
user, that is, to a contact’s data. In case both users are
led in the same WBSN, the communication between their
ecomes essential. Assuming that a user of WBSN1, User1,
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are p
seco
phaso access to resources of User2, enrolled in WBSN2, all
whichUser2 is registered in are identiﬁed.User2’s identi-
ail, and thesetofWBSNs inwhichhemaybe registered in
ble in the FOAF ﬁle of User1, as described in Section3.3.1.
identiﬁer
More
applying
User2 reler1 chooses a WBSN and the procedure described in this
executed.
ards, User1 clicks on the relationship with User2 and if
sts a relationship between User2 and User1, User2’s pro-
esources are delivered in regard to access control policies.
t relationships are unidirectional and the correctness of
onship direction has to be veriﬁed before granting access
t is not the same that User2 has a relationship with User1
included in User2’s FOAF ﬁle) than the other way round.
r to the login phase, the ﬁrst step is the acquisition of
ﬁle from the appropriate IdP and the second step the
n of resources from the appropriate Hosts. Again, the step
ing a protected resource of UMA protocol is executed a
times, one to acquire the FOAF ﬁle of User2, and another
resourcesofUser2 (whichmaybeperformedrepetitively).
, the fact that data are locally decrypted has to be recalled.
egarding the previous example, it should be noticed that
laims are composed of three structures: (P1) a proof of the
tence of User1; (P2) a proof of the relationship between
d User1, verifying that User1 relationship is within the
of User2; and (P3) a proof of User1 being in possession of
f data required to validate access control policies. There-
t P1 and P3, WBSN1 contacts to IdP User1. By contrast, to
, IdP User1 creates P2*, which is marked with * because
ence of a relationship between User2 and User1 has not
iﬁed by the appropriate IdP. Then, P2* is sent to IdP User2
oves the validity of P2* and provides P2 if the veriﬁcation
ful.
er accesses to data of an indirect contact
ering the existence of indirect relationships, the proce-
ther similar to the onedescribed in Section6.2.3 except for
interactions between all WBSNs involved in the relation-
articular, WBSN interactions are indispensable to acquire
at prove the existence of an indirect relationship between
users. For instance, given three users such that User1
y connected to User2 and User2 to User3, to verify the
elationship between User3 and User1 it is necessary to
proof of the existence of such relationship to IdP User3.
request sent to IdP User3 attaches a proof of the relation-
een User2 and User1 and IdP User3 veriﬁes if User3 has
ship with User2 to ﬁnally certify the indirect relationship
User3 and User1. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that apart
ting the proof, User3’s access control policies have to be
to get the requested access.
User accesses to data of a direct contact (Section6.2.3), the
es of acquiring identity data and resources are quite anal-
deed, themain difference is that IdPs provide identity data
s provide resources. Consequently, recalling the previous
and considering that this phase is the most challenging
ollowing section describes the acquisition of User3’s FOAF
ﬁle acquisition. The acquisition of a FOAF ﬁle requires as
A executions as WBSNs are involved in the relationship
e. In general, this procedure focuses on recursively repeat-
cquisition of FOAF ﬁles from each of the WBSNs involved
ect relationship. Indeed, this feature is what points out
direct relationship can be deﬁned as multiple direct ones.
ording to the proposed example two execution of UMA
rmed, the ﬁrst one to get the FOAF ﬁle of User2 and the
ne to get the FOAF ﬁle of User3. To better understand this
procedure is depicted in Fig. 6 and, in brackets, messages in regard to Table 2 are noticed.
speciﬁcally, after having acquired identity data of User2,
the procedure described in Section6.2.3, User1 clicks on
ationshipwith User3. Afterwards, User1 chooses to access
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identitydata andan theprotocol describednext is carried
N1 interacts with WBSN3 and it requests to IdP User3 the
OAF ﬁle (msg. 1 and 2 of Fig. 6). Subsequently, IdP User3
an access token and redirects WBSN1 to AM IdP User3
). Then, AM IdP User3 requests claims (msg. 7 and 8) that
gous to the ones requested when accessing a direct con-
pt for P2 which has to proof the existence of the indirect
ip between User3 and User1. Therefore, P1 is reused and
ed or requested depending on requested claims (msg. 9
By contrast, obtaining P2 requires the interaction with
Indeed, WBSN1 creates P2* that corresponds to a non-
proof of the relationship between User3 and User2 and
ogether with the P2 previously obtained (while accessing
s data) that certiﬁes the relationship between User2 and
IdP User3 (msg. 11 and 12). The IdP User3 veriﬁes the
of the relationship, creates the new P2 and sends it back
14). When WBSN1 gets claims (composed of P1, P2 and
s them to AM IdP User3 and if their veriﬁcation is suc-
e access token is delivered (msg. 15–18). Lastly, the token
IdP User3 and the requested ﬁle is provided (msg. 19–23).
, the IdP delivers an encrypted reduced FOAF ﬁle and it has
rypted in the user’s browser applying one of the schemes
in Section7.
tifying differences: eU+F vs U+F
nd the FOAF project lay the bases of U+F and eU+F. In con-
, both protocols share a signiﬁcant set of elements. Table 3
the number of involved entities, signatures, signatures
ns and messages interchanged in each protocol, being
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Coes of eU+F put in bold. Identiﬁed from the table, in eU+F
atures are required, a new group of entities is added (AM
ion Authorities, AM CAs), CA, and a new execution phase
ct relationships management is introduced.
Then, t
WBSNs
• Messag
to idendirect contact.
er to clearly notice the distinction between tasks and
eU+F incontrast toU+F, differences regarding theprotocol
procedure are detailed as follows:
zation (Section6.2.1). On the one hand, users have to cre-
t of keys. Moreover, the speciﬁcation of lists of trusted
CAs in AMs, trusted AM CAs and WBSN CAs in IdPs and
WBSN CAs in Hosts is required. On the other hand, users
store in chosen Hosts their resources, encrypted, and the
tric keys applied in the resources encryption in their IdPs.
gins in a WBSN (Section6.2.2). In eU+F the decryption of
entity data and resources is performed locally, at users
rs, following one of the schemes described in Section7.
cesses to data of a direct contact (Section6.2.3). Again,
he cryptographic schemes proposed in Section7 has to be
.
cesses to data of an indirect contact (Section6.2.4). This
s a new one since indirect relationships were out of the
f U+F.
rmore, messages content of U+F and eU+F differs to a
nt. Comparing interchangedmessages in eU+Fwith those
ged in U+F, the following features are distinguished:
xity of claims management increases because it is
d the accreditation of an indirect relationship.
and claims requests are signed by the appropriate AMs to
tee the trustworthiness of requested data.
ted claims are encrypted by AMs and decrypted by IdPs.
sely, IdPsencrypt requestedclaimsandAMsdecrypt them.
his issue protects identity data from being accessible to
.
es signed byAMs include the AMcertiﬁcate serial number
tify the signer entity.
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Table 3
Theoretical comparison U+F vs eU+F.
Phases Entities Signatures Signatures veriﬁcation # Messages
Login
FOAF ﬁle acquisition U+F 3+CI +CWBSN 1 1 12
eU+F 3+CI +CWBSN +CA 2 2 12
Resource acquisition U+F 3+CI +CWBSN 1 1 12
eU+F 3+CI +CWBSN +CA 2 2 12
Access to direct contact
FOAF ﬁle acquisition U+F 6+CI +CWBSN 6 6 25
eU+F 6+CI +CWBSN +CA 8 8 25
Resource acquisition U+F 7+CI +CWBSN 6 6 25
eU+F 7+CI +CWBSN +CA 8 8 25
Access to indirect contact
FOAF ﬁle acquisition U+F – – – –
eU+F 3 · (N+1) +CI +CWBSN +CA 8 · (N+1) 8 · (N+1) 25 · (N+1)
Resource acquisition U+F – – – –
8 · (N
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ingon theappliedcryptographic approach (seeSection7),
erchange of the decryption key in the Traditional PKC
or the decryption key creation in the IBE-based PKC
, is required to get access to resources.
es and identity data are delivered encrypted to be
ed at users’ browsers, thereby preventing WBSNs from
ng users’ data.
xposure minimization management
are multiple possibilities, making use of cryptography,
t WBSNs from visualizing resources and identity data
in them. However, regarding one of the security require-
cryption keys cannot be distributed off-line because, as
re used by a huge quantity of users and lots of them are
tly known, the procedure would be impractical. There-
brid encryption approach, similar to (Grafﬁ et al., 2010), is
resources management and an asymmetric one to iden-
anagement. Inparticular, apair of alternatives tomanage
ibute keys are described in the following sections, one of
ses on traditional Public Key Cryptography (PKC) and the
focuses on PKC based on Identity Based Encryption (IBE).
, it is an open issue the election of a particular algorithm.
rmore, it is essential to consider advantages and dis-
es of achieving data exposure minimization. The main
e is to prevent WBSNs from using personal data for their
oses such as sending spam or building proﬁles of users
dislikes. Nonetheless, there are some drawbacks to high-
tly, the time required to perform the protocol increases
e cryptographic operations applied. Second, users are in
encrypting their resources and uploading them and the
ey. Third, a particular amount of extra storage is required
eys. Finally, several messages are added to the protocol,
ose for providing the decryption keys. Next, Sections7.1
escribe the application of PKC and IBE and Section7.3
a comparison of the application of both schemes in eU+F.
itional PKC
echnique bases on the well-known concept of PKC
, 1996). Each user owns a key pair (Kpub and Kpv), or mul-
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tion
is prInitialization phase each user delivers his Kpub with his
and his resources decryption key, DK, to the preferred IdP.
uisition of identity data focuses on requesting the appro-
ub and use it to encrypt and retrieve the requested FOAF
Both s
in regard
not requi
users sha+1) 8 · (N+1) 25 · (N+1)
BSN or A regarding the type of CA; –, an element/action not required.
e other hand, resources, encrypted with DK, are retrieved
ypted using Kpub to reach DK. The use of this mechanism
introducing some new messages apart from those already
n Section6.1. To get a better picture of interchanged mes-
. 7 depicts the acquisition of resources, where (E) points
ages that already exist, (I) refers to messages that are new
e included within existing ones and (N) points out new
that have been created from scratch.
ased PKC
duce the burden of key management Identity Based
n (IBE) cryptography is applied (Boneh and Franklin,
e primary innovation of IBE is the use of user identity
s, e.g. email, address and so on, for encryption and signa-
iﬁcation.Kpub are created frompublic parameters together
sen user identity attributes. By contrast, Kpv are generated
d third parties, called herein IBE authorities. Depending on
ithm, the creation of the public key pair may require the
n with IBE authorities to establish some common vari-
erefore, it is recommendable the use of an algorithm like
and Yacobi, 1996) which focuses on exclusively creating
c key through public parameterswithout depending on an
l number chosen by a user or by an authority. Likewise,
lexity and quantity of involved IBE authorities depends on
ed proposal (Joe, 2009). The most signiﬁcant advantage of
unnecessary use of a public key infrastructure, thereby
certiﬁcates management and reducing the system com-
nd the cost for establishing and managing keys. Due to
revocation is also simpliﬁed. When attributes change, i.e.
pv does not have to be re-distributed or replaced in a public
y.
ing thateU+Fuses theusers’ email as an identityattribute,
attached Kpv is provided by an IBE authority, the acqui-
identity data and resources is analogous to the PKC
e except for not requiring the delivery of Kpub in IdPs.
parison: traditional PKC vs IBE-based PKC
ection analyses advantages and disadvantages of tradi-
C and IBE-based PKC schemes. A summary of the analysis
ted in Table 4.
chemes present a pair of signiﬁcant common advantages
to key management. Firstly, on-line key interchanges are
red. This is essential in applications like WBSNs because
re data amongmultiple contacts and key distributionmay
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Fig. 7. Traditional PKC – Acquiring User2
Table 4
PKC vs IBE-based PKC.
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√
en. Second, keys can be periodically updated preventing
the traditional PKC scheme, against the applied encryp-
ithmand in the IBE-basedPKCscheme, against theapplied
ithm. Indeed, in this last scheme, the update of keys may
e change of parameters in the used IBE key creation algo-
rning the traditional PKC scheme, it has the advantage of
ving extra entities in the protocol. Besides, this scheme
the huge beneﬁt of not affecting the protocols perfor-
a great extent, that is, resources are symmetrically
and just decryption keys management uses asymmet-
graphy. By contrast, in the IBE-based PKC scheme, apart
lving high computational operations, IBE authorities have
rt in the protocol. Nonetheless, these new entities release
sity of extra storage space for public keys, as well as the
of being IdPs in change of their delivery.
rements evaluation
as to fulﬁl all proposed requirements described in Sec-
herefore, each of them is analyzed, identifying their level
Mor
requ
verif
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not v
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fore,
are n
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resp
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Oction.
rning data conﬁdentiality and access control, this pro-
es on UMA and adds a concrete claims management.
hell, access control bases on the satisfaction of access
Hosts, AM
AM CAs,
changed’s resources.
olicies after proving the appropriate claims, that include
f the existence of a relationship between the administra-
requested data and the requester. Afterwards, a token,
rticular expiration time, is delivered according to the sat-
icies and then, access is granted until the token expires.
r, when the token is presented to IdPs or Hosts to get the
data, if the token veriﬁcation deﬁned in UMA involves
that the entity which presents the token is the same one
the tokenwas initially delivered, nobodyexcept for autho-
rs get access. By contrast, if the UMA implementation does
es this issue, an adversary (internal or external)may reach
and use it until it exceeds. However, this matter directly
on UMA and it is out of the scope of this paper.
ition, WBSNs may act on behalf of users and get access to
e the user is logged (note that data are encrypted). There-
revent WBSNs from acting on behalf of users when they
gged, each user authenticates himself against hisHost and
log-in and log-out in the WBSN.
cond requirement is interoperability and reusability in
o direct and indirect relationships. It is achieved due to
tralization of identity data, resources and access control
anagement, being all of them stored in IdPs, Hosts and
ectively. Data can be replaced, moved or updated with-
ing any service ofWBSNs.Moreover, differentWBSNs can
of the same resources, identity data and access control
f the same IdPs, Host and AMs are linked to them. More
ly, regarding interoperability, the use of the same identity
iﬁcation, FOAF ﬁles in this case, and the use of a concrete
n of UMA, including the speciﬁcation of claims and the
ster, addresses this issue.s and WBSNs the appropriate lists of trusted IdP CAs,
WBSN CAs and WBSNs. Then, the most relevant inter-
messages, that are sent between multiple entities, are
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Table 5
eU+F theoretical evaluation: protocol phases.
Phases Entities Encryptions Decryptions Signatures Signatures veriﬁcation # Messages
Initialization I +H+A+1 R * * * 12 · (I+H) + 2 ·A
Entities registration I +H+A+1 * * * * 10 · (I+H) + 2 ·A
Registration of resources and identity data I +H R * * * 2 · (I+H)
Speciﬁcation of information in WBSNs 1+S * * * * *
Login 6+ (C1 ∩C2) – 1 4 4 24
Authentication * * * * * *
FOAF ﬁle acquisition 3+C1 – – 2 2 12
Resource acquisition 3+C2 – 1 2 2 12
Access to direct contact 8+ (C1 ∩C2) 4 5 16 16 50
FOAF ﬁle acquisition 6+C1 2 2 8 8 25
Resource acquisition 7+C2 2 2 8 8 25
Access to indirect contact 3+5 ·N+(C1 ∩C2) 4 · (N+1) 4 · (N+1) 16 · (N+1) 16 · (N+1) 50 · (N+1)
FOAF ﬁle acquisition 3 · (N+1) +C1 2 · (N+1) 2 · (N+1) 8 · (N+1) 8 · (N+1) 25 · (N+1)
Resource acquisition 3+4 ·N+C2 2 · (N+1) 2 · (N+1) 8 · (N+1) 8 · (N+1) 25 · (N+1)
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issuer entities as well as by entities though which they
nally verify that signer entities are within the stored lists,
ey are trusted. In particular,messages related to the acqui-
laims are properly signed by IdPs and AMs and messages
ged between WBSNs are signed by the WBSN at which
ants to access to.
llowing key requirement is data privacy preservation
BSNs which is divided in two. On the one hand, WBSNs
ccess to users’ data because data as well as decryp-
are encrypted and their decryption is performed at
wsers, achieving data exposure minimization. Indeed,
are stored encrypted and identity data and decryption
encrypted when they are delivered, being all of them
ecrypted. Moreover, it has to be noticed that the local
n must be performed under security constraints, that is,
d data cannot leave the user’s browser. Furthermore, it
able the fact that Hosts store encrypted resources and,
s to WBSNs, they have not got access to data.
e other hand, access to the minimum data is related to
anagement. For example, the easiest way would be the
ge of complete FOAF ﬁles between WBSNs. Nevertheless,
the proposed requirement, data interchanged between
s limited to users identiﬁers, WBSNs in which they are
and, in case of indirect relationships, proofs that certify
onship between the administrator of the requested data
equester. Therefore, this requirement is satisﬁed to a very
nt, though leaving as an open issue that WBSNs know the
ips proofs.
nclude, the last requirement to analyze is simple key
ent. The proposed cryptographic schemes suppose the
of as many asymmetric key pairs and symmetric keys
esired. However, assuming that keys are indispensable
ryptographic approach, in the proposed schemes they
terchanged out of band and it simpliﬁes their manage-
eed, removing out of band interchanges of keys prevents
sible management confusions either intentionally or not.
onsidering the large quantity of WBSNs and the amount
shed relationships, out of band interchanges may become
eable.
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remvaluation analyses, in Section9.1, the workload of each
phase presented in Section6.2, and, in Section9.2, that of
es proposed to deal with data exposure minimization
in Section7. Speciﬁcally, it is evaluated the number
messages
decrease
requestin
also decrt/action not detailed; R, # of resources of a user; H, # of Hosts of a user;
s involved, the number of encryptions and decryptions
ut, the number of signatures and signatures veriﬁcation
d and the number of messages interchanged. Results are
zed in Tables 2 and 3.
col phases analysis
5 analyses each protocol phase. Note that the reuse of
d tokens is not considered, as well as data exposure mini-
techniques which are studied in the following section
.2).
ding the amount of entities the protocol involves, the use
osts and AMs is particularly noticeable in the initialization
relationships between all entities that interact along the
are established in this phase. Besides, a signiﬁcant amount
s come into play when accessing data of an indirect con-
is, the longer the relationship, the higher the number of
entities.
ption is applied for a couple of issues. On the one hand, in
lization resources are encrypted and uploaded to chosen
theotherhand, encryptionprotects thedeliveryof claims.
rypt data involved in requested claims and IdPs encrypt
ested data to be sent to AMs. Besides, it should be noticed
umber of encryptions increases when accessing data of an
ontact because more claims are requested.
d to encryption, decryptions are executed at claims man-
and at resources acquisition. In Section9.2, related to data
minimization, cryptographic operations are deeply ana-
ures are other elements at stake. They are applied to
e chain of trust which is created between entities that
ged messages. Signatures are performed by AMs when
g claims, by IdPs when delivering claims and by WBSNs
ding messages to other WBSNs. Again, the number of sig-
creaseswhen accessing data of an indirect contact because
ms and interactions among WBSNs are carried out.
ing expectations, the number of signatures veriﬁcation is
t to the number of signatures. In general, IdPs, AMs and
ake signatures and IdPs and AMs verify them.
ut not least, the amount of messages involved in eU+F is
le. It is specially signiﬁcant the number of interchanged
accessing data of an indirect contact. Nonetheless, it can
reusing tokens and claims because the reuse avoids
g tokens to AMs and claims to IdPs. Likewise, the reuse
eases the number of signatures and encryptions.
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Table 6
eU+F theoretical evaluation: data exposure minimization.
Phases Entities Encryptions Decryptions Signatures Signatures veriﬁcation # Messages
Traditional PKC – 2 3 2 2 3
FOAF ﬁle acquisition – 1 1 1 1 –
Resources acquisition – 1 2 1 1 3
IBE-based PKC C1 ∩C2 2 3 – – 3
FOAF ﬁle acquisition C1 1 1 – – –
Resources – – 3
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dBook+is able to access to Bob identity data and resources in
eisure as Fig. 9 depicts.
ifferent technologieshavebeenapplied in theprototypedevel-
ent. J2EE and J2SE 1.6 has been used for implementing the pairacquisition C2 1 2
E authorities; –, an element/action not required.
exposure minimization analysis
alysis of the cryptographic alternatives described in Sec-
erformed distinguishing the acquisition of identity data
cquisition of resources. Results are presented in Table 6.
this study bases on cryptographic matters and it is not
to the rest of eU+F messages.
ing entities involved in Traditional PKC and IBE-based PKC,
latter technique which applies a new group of entities,
authorities.
ing to encryption, both techniques require the same
f operations. IdPs create FOAFﬁles and encrypt themonce
. Likewise, resources acquisition involves the encryption
ces decryption keys.
other hand, the number of decryptions acquiring FOAF
resources differs. FOAF ﬁles acquisition simply bases
pting requested ﬁles. By contrast, resources decryption
ﬁrst, decrypting the resources decryption key and sub-
, applying this key to decrypt the resources.
tion to signatures, they are only applied in Traditional PKC
uiring requesters’ public keys. These keys are signed and
by requesters’ IdPs to be properly veriﬁed by administra-
.
, both techniques involve the interchange of three new
. These messages are used to get resources decryption
rimental evaluation
perimental evaluation corresponds to the analysis, from
l point of view, of eU+F through the development of a
. First, Section10.1presents thearchitecture, purposeand
details of the developed prototype. Second, Section10.2
the experimental results regarding the measurement of
col temporalworkload and its comparisonwith Facebook,
and LinkedIn.
F prototype
ection presents the development of a prototype to prove
ity of implementing eU+F in a simulated environment. It
sed of two WBSNs, FriendBook+and MyLeisure. The gen-
tecture is depicted in Fig. 8. More speciﬁcally, a couple of
uple of Hosts, a couple of WBSNs and four AMs (one for
t and IdP) are the entities at stake. Thus, a total of eight
re used and located in different places along a local net-
e key point is to verify that data of MyLeisure remains
to FriendBook+and the other way round. Users’ identity
ﬁle and contacts) corresponds to their name, nationality,
noti
mult
F
Bob,
Then
reso
her
her
decr
and
AM
ward
to it
his i
resp
Frien
MyL
D
opmil, school and contacts relationships. For simplicity rea-
prototype only works with direct relationships. However,
performance results allow us to get estimated ﬁgures of
nce of the protocol for indirect relationships, because asFig. 8. Prototype architecture.
n Section6.2.4, an indirect relationship can be deﬁned as
direct ones.
, it is assumed the existence of a pair of users, Alice and
e enrolled in FriendBook+and Bob enrolled in MyLeisure.
arding Fig. 8, Alice establishes her identity data and
decryption keys in IdP1, encrypted resources in Host1,
s control policies in AM IdP1 and AM Host1 and, ﬁnally,
te key locally, in her personal computer, to perform
ns. By contrast, Bob establishes his identity data in IdP2
rces in Host2 and also uses a couple of AMs, AM IdP2 and
2, to establish and manage access control policies. After-
ce Alice enrols in FriendBook+, IdP1 and Host1 are linked
wise, when Bob enrols in MyLeisure, he speciﬁes where
ty data and resources are stored, that is, in IdP2 and Host2
ely. The experimental evaluation veriﬁes that Alice fromFig. 9. Alice access to Bob’s data.
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Analysing t
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Long-in
Access di
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Access di
Access inedWBSNs, FriendBook+andMyLeisure. Glassﬁsh3.0.1 has
lied to manage IdPs, Hosts and AMs and MySQL 5.2.27
ll required data. Additionally, to measure network com-
ons, Firebug 1.7.3 (a Firefox extension) has also been
ides, in respect to cryptographic algorithms, the scheme
in Section7.1 is followed. In relation to symmetric cryp-
, AES 128 is used to encrypt/decrypt resources (photos)
spect to asymmetric cryptography RSA 2048 is the algo-
plied, assuming that each user owns a certiﬁcate and a
ey of length 2048bytes. On the other hand, photos man-
is implementationhave a size between200kband300kb.
is chosen as an upper limit as the average size considering
l., 2006).
erimental results
mporal workload of the protocol is analyzed in this
t is measured the time spent while executing different
phases. More speciﬁcally, the access to personal iden-
(proﬁle), the access to a personal resource (photo), the
a direct contact identity data (proﬁle) and the access to
ontact resource (photo) are analyzed. With this results,
ated and analyzed the workload of accessing an indirect
entity data and an indirect contact resource. The study
esenting, in Section10.2.1, the prototype analysis results
ludes detailing, in Section10.2.2, a comparison between
type and three successfulWBSNs, Facebook,MySpace and
mporal workload
talworkload of performing any kind of access ismeasured
st of interchanging protocol messages until reached the
data (CdataAcquisition) multiplied by a parameter  (that
ds to information not reused from previous requests)
ost of performing the requireddecryptions (CdataDecryption),
oreover, an analysis regarding possible values of is per-
y comparing the number of signatures carried out and the
f messages interchanged in the worst case (no elements
d) and in the best case (all possible elements are reused)
ser logs in to a WBSN, a user accesses a direct contact’s
a user accesses an indirect contact’s data (see Table 7).
ing that reusing is unachievable regarding the acquisition
rsonal identity data because it is the ﬁrst requested data,
rmed analysis, presented in Table 8, shows that 68.75%
res and 51% of messages are reused, concluding that, on
hemaximum level of reuse is 59.87%. Consequently, three
 are considered,  is 1 when not a single piece of data
d, 0.70 when 50% of data are reused and 0.41 when all
reused, that is 59.87%. The workload has been measured
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ut supposing the reuse of any element ( =1).
ataAccess · + CdataDecryption (1)
prototyp
compose
data acqu
tionships
he reuse of data in eU+F.
Worst case Best case % reuse
es
24 18 25
rect contact 50 18 64
direct contact 50 18 64
s
4 2 50
rect contact 16 2 87.5
direct contact 16 2 87.5ce acquisition 1 · (N+1) 9 · (N+1)
rs in the relationship)−1, N>1; –, an element/action not required.
ding to these features, plot presented in Fig. 10 depicts
load of accessing to the proﬁle and to a photo of a user
d in WBSN1 (FriendBook+) and to the proﬁle and to a
a direct contact enrolled in WBSN2 (MyLeisure). Further-
order to distinguish CdataAcquisition and CdataDecryption, the
regarding these individual costs in the worst case, that
is also presented. It is identiﬁed that CdataAcquisition implies
orkload while, CdataDecryption is rather small. Although
phic operations depend on the applied algorithm, the
n scheme draws satisfactory results. Decryptions take
on average, 83.83ms for proﬁles and 89.83ms for photos.
that proﬁles are encrypted through an asymmetric
and photos through a symmetric one and the fact that
ric algorithms are slower than symmetric algorithms,
ow that photos are bigger in size than proﬁles and then,
load is rather similar.
sing the same features as in the previous plot, except for
s to the proﬁle of a user registered in WBSN1 (because
ot possible), Fig. 11 presents workloads in regard to dif-
values. It is remarkable that to achieve successful results,
matter of concern. Besides, as expected, interoperability
WBSN1 and WBSN2 increases the workload. The differ-
eenaccessing toaparticulardata inWBSN1andaccessing
2 is 1191.90ms when =1, 834.33ms when =0.70 and
s when  =0.41.
e other hand, the establishment of indirect relationships
nging goal achieved in eU+F but not implemented in thee. Nonetheless, assuming that an indirect relationship is
d of direct ones, the workload is estimated as the cost of
isition multiplied by and by the length of indirect rela-
(n) plus the cost of datadecryption (seeEq. (2)). Therefore,
Avg. reuse % maxReuse
51 59.87 0.41 (1–59%)
68.75
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sented in Fig. 12(a) and (b) show the estimated workload
t to different values of and n, given that n is bounded to
heoretical studies pointed out in Section6.1.3.
ataAccess · ·n+ CdataDecryption (2)
the analysis it is identiﬁed that according to the longest
elationship (n=6) in theworst case, =1, about20,851ms
ed to access a chosen proﬁle and about 17,744ms to a
orde
as th
Link
and
one
to ac
cont
mea
the a
type
be c
Linkhoto. On the contrary, in the best case,  =0.41 for n=6,
49ms and 7,275ms are taken to access a proﬁle and to
espectively. Nevertheless, the reuse of data, for instance
redential, is highly probable and the average workload
are based
nique can
cryptogra
is bounde
Fig. 12. Estimation of temporal workload for indson.
ken as a representative measure. In particular, for =0.7,
is 2,432ms for n=1 and 14,596ms for n=6 to access a
d 4,140ms for n=1 and 12,421ms s for n=6 to access a
omparison with other WBSNs
of the most currently successful WBSNs, Facebook, MyS-
LinkedIn, have been chosen to compare their workload
experimental prototype (FriendBook+and MyLeisure).
each WBSN, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn, a pair
ts has been opened. Then, a set of six photos has been
to the fouropenedaccounts (threephotosper account). In
each comparative results, the set of six photos is the same
e managed in FriendBook+and MyLeisure. Nonetheless,
is a well known WBSN but not focused on photo sharing
, photos have been uploaded as proﬁle photos and just
em remains visible. Afterwards, using FireBug, the time
to the personal proﬁle, to a personal photo, to a direct
proﬁle and to a direct contact’s photo in all WBSNs is
. Note that although the prototype does not implement
ntication, that is included in the login phase, the proto-
kload of accessing to the personal proﬁle of a user can
ared with the one measured in Facebook, MySpace and
because authentication techniques of WBSNs like these
onpasswords and thus, theworkloadof such simple tech-
be disregarded. According to Eq. (1), as in currentWBSNs
phic techniques are not applied, the analyzed workload
d to CdataAcquisition.
irect relationships.
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Fig. 13. Prototype, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn total cost comparison.
Fig. 14. Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn indirect relationships comparison.
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orsmparison is presented in Fig. 13. It compares tempo-
for accessing to the proﬁle of a user when he logins
SN, to one of his photos and to the proﬁle and to a
a direct contact. These costs are respectively 3,529ms,
, 3,432ms and 2,913ms for the prototype, whereas they
ms, 626ms, 1,438ms and 842ms in the case of MySpace,
, 766ms, 2,556ms and 624ms in the case of Fakebook
ms, 541ms, 3,422ms and 571ms in the case of LinkedIn.
l, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn follow a similar pat-
l cases. All these WBSNs produce higher workload than
type accessing to the personal proﬁle and lower in the
g cases. In this regard some ﬁndings are highlighted. First,
re richer in Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn than in the
and then, higher TW is expected. In particular, personal
re specially richer in MySpace, e.g. including videos, and
he fact that its implementation and architecture are not
to the public, rich proﬁles can affect the TW. Second,
interoperability through the decentralization of identity
urces and access control policies is a challenging issue
pectedly produces a workload increase. Then, the work-
ssing to data of other user (proﬁle or photo) is higher
totype than in any other compared WBSN. Surprisingly,
ccessing to the proﬁle of other user in LinkedIn is really
he prototype. Nonetheless, since the real implementation
itecture of LinkedIn are not available to the public, con-
sults cannot be obtained. Besides, regarding the access
s, either personal or of other user, the prototype’s TW
hest one. It can be caused by the amount of messages
ged in the protocol. In any case, as explained below, the
is far from being developed by powerful software and
on optimized hardware mechanisms, in contrast to real
ke the ones analyzed, which are developed by huge com-
other hand, the relevance of indirect relationship man-
requires its analysis. First of all, to establish comparable
rs and even not being currently possible, it is assumed
book, MySpace and LinkedIn allow the establishment of
elationships of a maximum length of six. Then, given Eq.
orkload is calculated considering CdataAcquisition multiplied
elationship length. Besides, note that Facebook, MySpace
dIn, as far as we know, do not reuse data because ele-
e tokens or claims are not used. Concerning this feature,
sents achieved results. On thewhole, it is remarkable that
indirect relationship workload is similar to the devel-
totype accessing to a proﬁle when 50% of elements are
=0.7) and lower than the prototype when accessing to
urthermore, results show that, when accessing to a pro-
ace workload is close to  =0.41 in the prototype and it
han the prototype accessing to a photo when all possible
are reused. In relation to LinkedIn, accessing to a proﬁle
rable with the prototype when not reusing ( =1) and,
st, accessing to a photo in LinkedIn is lower than in the
although all possible elements are reused.
, there are a couple of points to highlight against and
of the developed prototype. On the negative side, in
tions performed for this experimental evaluation, enti-
aged (IdPs, Host, . . .) run in a local network and it is
that CdataAcquisition was higher in a real environment. On
ive side, contrary to the prototype, it is presumable that
anies, which develop WBSNs like Facebook and MyS-
LinkedIn, own robust and efﬁcient infrastructures and
ms, for instance cache servers, which help to speed users’
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the wthereby achieving successful CdataAcquisition times. In con-
rom the authors’ point of view, taking into account the
of dealing with indirect relationships in an interoperable
ent, the workload of eU+F can be considered reasonable.
trast, in t
n ·6. Mor
the wors
be highligFig. 15. Managing all types of relationships.
ussion
can be a more powerful approach. It can manage all kind
nships without being restricted to the ones where the
rator is discovered from the requester, that is the approach
taken. The management of this new set of relationships
ased on discovering contacts from the administrators to
esters (contrary to the process currently performed in
th approaches are depicted in Fig. 15. Therefore, with the
oach, the access control management will be carried out
the same direction as the contacts discovery. The new
will work as follows.
, the requester speciﬁes the administrator’s email and a
which the administrator is supposed to be registered in
equently, the procedure starts and it is described through
ing examples. On the one hand, assuming that U1 wants
to U6 (Fig. 15), the ﬁrst step is equivalent to User accesses
f a direct contact, described in Section6.2.4, the access is
f U1 is in U6’s FOAF ﬁle and access control policies are sat-
the other hand, in a more challenging situation, U1 wants
to U10’s data. In this case, the process starts requesting to
s contact the existence of a relationship with U1. Thus, as
d U12 are the U10’s contacts, the request is sent to IdP U9,
nd IdP U12. Afterwards, if any contact has a relationship
the process is recursively repeated. In this example two
and U12, have a relationship with U1 and due to that fact a
oofs areobtained, one that certiﬁesU10–U1 throughU9 and
ne that certiﬁesU10–U1 throughU12. Finally, ifwhenusing
the obtained proofs, access control policies are satisﬁed,
U10’s data are granted to U1.
heless as it can be devised form the previous example,
ess can be computationally hard. Firstly, it is possible
a solution will be reached because a pair of users may
nnected. Secondly, if the network graph is signiﬁcantly
ugh relationship depth is bounded to six (Section6.1.3),
ber of requests to obtain a proof of the existence of a
hip may be unmanageable. For instance, supposing that a
ts to access to another that is distanced six jumps and also
a WBSN in which each user has n contacts on average, in
t case the number of requests would be
∑6
i=1n
i. By con-he best case, the number of requests would be limited to
e speciﬁcally, results of the number of requests regarding
t and best case are depicted in Fig. 16(a) and (b) and it can
hted the high cost involved in discovering contacts.
18
Fig
Despit
powerful
where u
unknown
identiﬁca
conseque
increase.
only acce
indirect w
the more
tor are fo
policy the
12. Conc
WBSN
improvem
regard, th
interoper
as the pr
carefully
of interch
the requi
Moreove
book+and
of implem
some suc
lyzed. Re
be consid
supposin
WBSNs, s
This p
hand,ma
requires
graphic a
multiple
efﬁciency
2007) or
2002)has
straints a
AMs is a
by Kang
ple with
a detaile
clients. O
if a parti
tion6.2),
for instan
considera
is to wor
protectio
users rel
an indire
provide a
users, be
fact, after
network
Appendi
In thi
e A.1
ent
ize i
h have not got a concrete size are limited by symbols 〈 and 〉
they suppose an additional pair of bytes.
A.1
messages content technical speciﬁcation.
Bits Bytes
rations
ature (RSA-2048+SHA1) 160 20
ryption (RSA-2048) longvariable longvariable
ments
en value 43 ≈6
en expiration time 13 ≈2
identiﬁer 39 ≈5
et 39 ≈5
r identiﬁer 160 20
e and time 32 4
tiﬁcate serial number (Max.) 40 5
(Min.) 4 ≈1
irection url (Max.) 16,384 2,048
(Min.) 4 ≈1
uctures
ationship X–Y 451 ≈57
reditation 272 34. 16. Discovering indirect relationships in a powerful approach.
ehighlighteddrawbacks, thisprotocol couldbeextremely
because the whole network (independently of WBSNs
sers are registered in) could be analyzed and even
relationships could be identiﬁed. Indeed, it is possible the
tion of different relationships to reach a certain user and
ntly, the possibilities of getting access to requested data
For instance, an administrator establishes that his data are
ssible to users with whom the established relationship is
ith a maximum length of four. According to this policy,
relationships between a requester and the administra-
und, the more possibilities of satisfying the access control
re are.
lusions and open research issues
s are demanding developments and their research and
ent are key issues for the research community. In this
is proposal presents a protocol, called eU+F, to achieve
ability and indirect relationships between WBSNs as well
otection of data from WBSNs providers. The protocol is
detailed, describing goals, involved entities and all kind
anged messages. The protocol is also evaluated against
Tabl
elem
the s
whic
and
Table
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Ope
Sign
Enc
Ele
Tok
Tok
File
Tick
Use
Dat
Cer
Red
Str
Rel
Accrements and its performance is analyzed theoretically.
r, a eU+F prototype composed of a pair of WBSNs, Friend-
MyLeisure, has been developed. It shows the feasibility
enting the protocol and its workload in comparison with
Data requ
(Min
Data resp
(Mincessful WBSNs, Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn, is ana-
sults drawn from the evaluation point out that eU+F can
ered an acceptable and challenging approach that, even
g, in general, a workload increase in respect to current
atisfactorily attains all established requirements.
roposal can be extended in several ways. On the one
nagingdataexposureminimization throughcryptography
the analysis and selection of the most efﬁcient crypto-
lgorithm, being indispensable a comparative study of
algorithms. Likewise, the improvement of the proposal
using lightweight cryptography (Eisenbarth and Kumar,
the application of the principle of asymmetry (Jiang et al.,
tobealsoanalyzed. Furthermore, the speciﬁcationof con-
nd rules to specify what it is considered a trusted IdPs and
future open issue. The idea is similar to the one proposed
et al. (2011). They present the creation of guardians, peo-
a new profession, to protect personal data and it includes
d description of legal relations between guardians and
ther relevant matter is that currently, the protocol aborts
cular AM, IdP or WBSN is not considered trusted (Sec-
being desirable a dynamic speciﬁcation of trusted entities,
ce, requesting the appropriate administrator about the
tion of a newentity as a trusted one. Finally, a further step
k towards the protocol improvement to reach a complete
n of users privacy by preventing WBSNs from inferring
ationships. In particular, regarding the access to data of
ct contact, as pointed out in Section6.2.4, a WBSN has to
proof of the existence of a relationship between a pair of
ing this proof noticed by the recipient WBSN. Due to that
multiple executions of eU+F, WBSNs may infer the social
structure.
x A. Technical details
s Appendix messages managed in eU+F are detailed.
presents the size in bits/bytes of each applied operation,
and structure. Furthermore, Tables A.2 and A.3 describe
n bits/bytes of each eU+F message. Notice that structuresest (Max.) 3,624 453
.) 256 16
onse (Max.) 44,704 5,588
.) 264 33
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Table A.2
eU+F messages: a technical speciﬁcation (part I).20
Table A.3
eU+F messages: a technical speciﬁcation (part II).
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